








This article provides an introduction to the special issue on post-neoliberalism. It
does so by considering challenges to the neoliberal order that have come, post-
financial crisis, from the political right. It looks closely at the relation of neoliberalism
to conservatism, on one hand, and libertarianism, on the other, in order to address
the threat posed to the neoliberal order by paleoconservatism, neoreactionary pol-
itics, ordonationalism, libertarian paternalism, and different forms of sovereignty and
elite power. The final section of this introduction reflects on the challenge to the
neoliberal orthodoxy posed by the current COVID-19 crisis. For while events of
2020–21 have facilitated new forms of privatization of many public services and
goods, they also signal, potentially, a break from the neoliberal orthodoxies of the
previous four decades, and, in particular, from their overriding concern for the
market.
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The period since 2008 has witnessed a combination of two critical and
scholarly trends with respect to the category of neoliberalism. Firstly, this
period has been one in which the historical and sociological analysis of
neoliberalism has expanded, deepened and improved to a remarkable
extent. The English publication of Foucault’s celebrated lectures on neo-
liberalism in 2008 (Foucault, 2008) was followed by the publication of
numerous influential works building on Foucault’s genealogy of neo-
liberal reason (Dardot and Laval, 2014; Brown, 2015). Simultaneously,
historians of economics and ideas produced several landmark publica-
tions on the formation and interaction of different schools of neoliberal
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thought (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Burgin, 2012; Stedman Jones,
2012; Mirowski, 2013). More recently, the history of neoliberal thought
and politics has been enriched to account for the family (Cooper, 2017),
international markets (Slobodian, 2018), human rights (Whyte, 2019)
and much besides. Common to virtually all of this work has been a
dedication to tracing the roots of neoliberalism back well beyond the
origins of ‘Thatcherism’ or the crisis of Keynesianism, to its intellectual
kernel in the 1920s and 30s.
Secondly, this has also been a period in which the existential state of
neoliberalism has been repeatedly questioned. The banking crisis, which
was acted on in ways that appeared resolutely un-neoliberal, briefly
appeared to herald the kind of ‘policy paradigm shift’ that had led to
the rise of monetarist and other neoliberal ideas in the late 1970s (Hall,
1993). This swiftly turned out to be a chimera, not least because the
framing of the crisis as an ‘emergency’, ‘war’ or ‘exception’ granted
permission to policy elites to do whatever it took to defend the financial
status quo (Davies, 2013; Tooze, 2018). However, in the years that
followed, the question arose of whether neoliberalism had actually sur-
vived intact, or whether it had mutated into something else. Led by
Peck, scholars raised the possibility of ‘post-neoliberalism’ (Peck et al.,
2010; Springer, 2014), ‘zombie neoliberalism’ (Peck, 2010) or ‘mutant
neoliberalism’ (Callison and Manfredi, 2020) and continue to ask
whether this is ‘still neoliberalism’ (Peck and Theodore, 2019). The
electoral ascendency of ‘populist’ leaders and parties over the 2010s
was interpreted by many as a rejection of a technocratic, neoliberal
agenda (e.g. Hopkin and Blyth, 2019). Neoliberalism appeared to
some to have acquired newly ‘authoritarian’, ‘illiberal’ or ‘anti-
democratic’ qualities (Bruff, 2014; Rose, 2017; Hendrikse, 2018;
Brown, 2019).
For over a decade, therefore, we have benefited from an ever-more
fine-grained ‘history of the present’, while at the same time becoming less
sure whether this really is still our ‘present’ condition. The relationship
between ‘neoliberalism’ (as a set of ideas and policies that evolved from
the 1920s onwards) and our current epoch is at least an open question.
The category of neoliberalism continues to provide an invaluable tool
with which to understand political economy and society today, not least
because the scholarship surrounding it continues to grow in its richness
and scope. And yet, with every year that passes, the number of appar-
ently countervailing tendencies within and against neoliberalism is also
growing. On the basis of a vastly improved understanding of what neo-
liberalism is, we can at least now agree that it is unlikely to terminate
with any definitive paradigm-shifting crisis. In that sense, ‘post-
neoliberalism’ cannot refer to something that comes exclusively after
neoliberalism, but rather – as with the notion of ‘post-Fordism’ – to a
set of emergent rationalities, critiques, movements and reforms that take
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root in neoliberal societies and begin to weaken or transform key tenets
of neoliberal reason and politics.
The crisis of Keynesianism, that provided the moment for neoliberal
policy ideas to be adopted and implemented, obeyed a classically
Kuhnian rhythm of a paradigm shift. A coherent set of theories and
predictions, embedded in a set of elite institutions, ceased to explain
the problems that were afflicting many capitalist societies. Meanwhile,
a rival set – associated heavily with the Chicago School and publicized
via think tanks and the media – promised to alleviate crises, inflation in
particular. Keynesianism, built upon the epistemic and technical affor-
dances of the wartime state, was met by an alternative with similarly
programmatic, technocratic and macroeconomic ambitions (Mitchell,
1998). The regime that emerged – pushed by the right – was one that
privileged the combating of inflation via monetary policy, the weakening
of organized labour, tax cuts on high incomes and capital, privatization
of public assets, greater regulatory tolerance of monopoly, and a steady
restructuring of the welfare state so as to prioritize work, family and
‘personal responsibility’ (Harvey, 2005]). By the 1990s, as this regime
entered its political golden era, with inflation largely conquered and cap-
ital increasingly mobile, a more centrist model of neoliberalism became
hegemonic in Western democracies, in which an active state sought to
inculcate innovation and flexibility in the social realm, with a view to
enhancing national ‘competitiveness’ and attracting inward investment.
At the same time, rising private indebtedness fuelled growth in consump-
tion, home ownership and higher education. That this phase of neo-
liberalism was often overseen by centre-left parties, rather than those
of the right, signifies that – as a political project – it was as much
about efforts to reform and renew the ‘social’ realm in an entrepreneurial
direction as to reduce constraints on capital (Dardot and Laval, 2014).
However, this same phase of neoliberalism (which arose after the
demise of state socialism) also confirmed the Foucauldian insight, that
neoliberalism is not only a policy paradigm or institutional template, but
a mode of subjectivity, operating via networks of capillary power inside
and outside the state, taking particular root in those technocratic para-
state institutions of central banks, quangos, outsourcers, and multilateral
agencies. It is an ethical and social way of life, and it is unlikely to be
displaced or replaced simply via a shift in policy consensus.
Just as Keynesianism was displaced by a ‘paradigm’ that bore certain
formal resemblances to it, neoliberalism is being corroded and displaced
by logics and rationalities that share some of its formal qualities: its
suspicion of the state, its emphasis on decentralization, its re-formatting
of individual subjectivity. We can witness varieties of what Smith and
Burrows in their contribution to this special issue term ‘redecentraliza-
tion’, renewing the attack on the liberal and technocratic state, in the
name of some more authentic liberty. On this front, post-neoliberal
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tendencies operate on the margins, unsettling the capacity of government
to govern, and reasserting the authority of private ownership and modes
of private governance. But we can also witness varieties of a ‘recentrali-
zation’, restoring powers to the nation and the sovereign (however under-
stood), which had been stolen by technocratic, multilateral and financial
authorities.
The special issue on ‘Post-Neoliberalism?’, which this article intro-
duces, was conceived, assembled and written over the course of 2018–
20. The majority of the papers reflect on the ascendency of right-wing
political movements and ideas in Europe and the United States, which
have mounted an increasingly vigorous critique of the neoliberal status
quo in recent years, gaining a number of electoral breakthroughs around
the world. But the timing meant that none of the papers was able to
confront fully or evaluate the most recent crisis of neoliberalism, namely
the COVID-19 pandemic that engulfed the globe over 2020. In this intro-
duction, we seek to contextualize the papers in two ways, with a view to
making sense of contemporary ‘post-neoliberalism’. Firstly, we reflect on
some of the tensions lurking within the history of neoliberal thought, in
relation to parallel traditions of conservative and libertarian thought. To
the extent that one powerful challenge to neoliberal technocracy and
globalization today is coming from the right, it is important to clarify
the longstanding distinctions and differences that shape and animate that
opposition. Secondly, and more speculatively, we consider some of the
‘post-neoliberal’ features of the politics surrounding COVID-19. The
events of 2020–21 have facilitated new forms of privatization of many
public services and goods, yet it is hard to deny that (especially in terms
of macroeconomic policy) they also herald a break from the neoliberal
orthodoxies of the previous four decades. We consider how these events
may intersect with the phenomena and ideas explored by the papers in
this issue and conclude by noting the declining autonomy of ‘the market’
and of ‘competition’ as organizing principles of social and global
organization.
Neoliberalism: Between Conservatism and Libertarianism?
It is worth, then, addressing the hybrid nature of neoliberalism more
closely in order to question the value of adding the prefix ‘post-’ to a
liberalism that is already ‘neo’ – a question that is raised rather than
decided by the title of this special issue. One way to do this, as both
‘post-’ and ‘neo-’ signify a relation of time, in the form of a reaction to, or
mutation of, that which existed previously, is to think historically.
Wendy Brown (2015), in her book Undoing the Demos, rightly argues
that neoliberalism originated as much in opposition to fascism as to
socialism – a point that Foucault (2008) addresses in detail in his analysis
of ordoliberalism in his now-famous lectures on biopolitics. But this
6 Theory, Culture & Society 38(6)
opposition to fascism did not lead to a uniform view of the role of the
state, liberty or sovereignty, and from its inception in the 1920s and 1930s
onwards, neoliberalism has a complex and at times uneasy relationship
with other movements on the political right, in particular conservatism
and libertarianism. At the Walter Lippmann Colloquium in 1938 – the
starting point of European neoliberalism for Foucault – differences were
aired that became more significant over time. The majority of those pre-
sent sided with Hayek in calling for the reinvention of liberalism in ways
that broke with classical forms of laissez-faire liberalism associated with
figures such as Adam Smith. They did so by moving away from a nat-
uralistic conception of markets as things that worked best through min-
imal government interference and instead asked what government and
the state could do in service of markets and their freedoms. But not
everyone agreed. Notably, Ludwig von Mises, whose work became the
key point of departure for the libertarian thinker Murray Rothbard (see
the article by Melinda Cooper in this issue), was one of a few to continue
to extol the virtues of classical liberalism, arguing that it was not ‘the free
play of economic forces’ but rather ‘the anti-liberal policies of govern-
ments’ that was the problem (Mises in Reinhoudt and Audier, 2018: 121).
Other participants in the colloquium were less vocal at this event but,
over the coming years, revealed differences with Hayek and drifted away
from the Mont Pèlerin Society, in particular Raymond Aron and
Michael Polanyi, who worked instead with the Congress for Cultural
Freedom through the 1950s (see Gane, 2016). Of the two, Aron was
more outspoken in his critique of Hayek, not only rejecting his raw
economic individualism in favour of a more traditional brand of political
conservatism but also attacking his conception of freedom in a devastat-
ing review of Hayek’s magnum opus, The Constitution of Liberty
(Aron, 1994).
Even among those who are commonly positioned together as central
figures in the history of the neoliberal project there are important meth-
odological and political differences. Wendy Brown, for example, argues
that Hayek ‘was raised on Ordoliberalism’ (2015: 59), but this was not, in
fact, the case as Hayek’s economic and political views were shaped by
key Austrian figures such as Menger and von Mises, and many of the
positions of key ordoliberal thinkers, in particular Wilhelm Röpke, were
incompatible with the new brand of economic individualism championed
by Hayek from the 1940s onwards. Brown’s reading is consistent with
that of Foucault, who describes ordoliberalism in terms of a call for the
‘general regulation of society by the market’ (Foucault, 2008: 145) – a
process from which nothing is seen to be sacred (Foucault, 2008: 133).
This understanding, however, is mistaken, as figures such as Röpke were
deeply conservative and by no means believed either that principles of
competition should be injected into all spheres of social life or that all
societal institutions should or could be opened up to the free play of
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market forces. In A Humane Economy, Röpke is quite clear on this point:
‘The truth is that competition, which we need as a regulator in a free
economy, comes up on all sides against limits which we would not wish it
to transgress’ (1960: 128). In this text, Röpke defends institutions such as
the family and the church and argues that ‘genuine communities’ and
‘tradition’ should be protected from intrusion by the market. Elsewhere,
Röpke asserted the value of European culture, and even spoke in defence
of apartheid on the grounds that ‘the South African Bantu’ was ‘not only
a man of an utterly different race, but, at the same time, stems from a
completely different type and level of civilization’ (Röpke, 1965: 10).
Such views set Röpke apart from most other members of the Mont
Pèlerin Society (see Slobodian, 2018:146–81 for a detailed assessment
of his position), and reveal conservative and racist commitments that
are far removed from a simplistic belief in the unbridled powers of com-
petition, as depicted by Foucault in his biopolitics lectures.
Neoliberalism, then, emerged in tension, on one hand, with laissez-
faire liberalism or what subsequently became known as libertarianism (a
term that Hayek rejected; see Hayek, 1960: 352), and, on the other, to
forms of conservativism that asserted the value of religion (in particular
Christianity), nation, and race. In terms of the former of these move-
ments, in the Road to Serfdom Hayek takes an explicit stand against what
he calls ‘a dogmatic laissez-faire attitude’ on the grounds that the ‘forces
of competition’ should be used as a means for ‘co-ordinating human
effort’ rather than ‘leaving things just as they are’ (1944: 37). This, in
turn, became central to the work of the Mont Pèlerin Society, which,
from its inception, addressed the idea that ‘competition can be made
more effective and more beneficent by certain activities of government
than it would be without them’ (Hayek, 1948: 110). In terms of the latter
movement, Hayek takes an explicit stand against conservatism in the
postscript to The Constitution of Liberty (1960: 343–55), arguing that it
stands against ‘drastic change’ and, because of this, tends to be dragged
along paths not of its own choosing. Hayek says, by contrast, that his
own brand of liberalism, unlike conservatism, has the ‘courage and con-
fidence’ to oppose socialism and also provide a genuine alternative (see
Hayek, 1960: 345). Because of this, Hayek argues that it is wrong to
understand socialism, liberalism and conservatism as different positions
along a single line that runs from socialism on the left to conservatism on
the right, and liberalism somewhere in between. Instead, he plots these
political positions as different corners of a triangle, with conservatism in
one corner, trying to pull back from liberalism and socialism in the other
two (Hayek, 1960: 344).
The importance of this metaphor of the triangle is that, for Hayek,
conservatism and liberalism do not exist along a line of continuity but
instead converge on and depart from socialist ideas from quite different
angles. Through the course of The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek is quite
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clear about the differences between conservatism and neoliberalism.
The former, he says, has a fondness for authority; it misunderstands
the nature and workings of economic forces; it fears new ideas; and it
is prone to a ‘strident nationalism’ as it often seeks to defend ‘our indus-
try’ (something, he argues, that it shares with socialism; see Hayek, 1960:
348–50). Neoliberalism, Hayek argues, provides a corrective to each of
these mistakes: traditional forms of authority (be these of church, state,
or family) and all ‘obstacles to free growth’ should be swept aside by the
‘spontaneous forces’ of the free market; economic forces should no
longer be understood through formal models of equilibrium but through
the dynamics of the price mechanism; and there should be a new form of
internationalism based not on workers’ rights or solidarity but the fric-
tionless movement of capital and labour across national borders.
Hayek’s position, however, became more complex over time as it
drifted between libertarianism and conservatism, particularly from the
1960s onwards. In early texts such as The Road to Serfdom (1944) and his
inaugural address to the Mont Pèlerin Society (1948: 107–18), Hayek
stood against libertarian calls for small government and the minimal
state and argued instead that both can be harnessed to serve market
forces and freedoms. But in his later work, he was less concerned with
occupying and reprogramming the state. Nowhere is this clearer than in
his work on the denationalization of money (Hayek, 1976; for useful
commentaries see Cooper and Konings, 2015; Ingham, 2020), in which
he argues that central banks should be disbanded and replaced by com-
mercial banks that are free to issue currencies from which consumers can
choose. Hayek attacks the ability for any nation-state to exercise mon-
etary control over its territory and proposes instead that money should
be fully marketized rather than used by national governments to serve
their own political interests. The boundaries between neoliberalism and
libertarianism here become harder to define as Hayek moves away from a
project that seeks to redefine the rationale for government and the state
along market-based lines, and instead seeks to break the monopoly of the
state over the money supply in a bid to enhance individual consumer
freedoms.
It might be presumed, in the light of the postscript to The Constitution
of Liberty and the above arguments of The Denationalization of Money,
that, over time, Hayek’s neoliberalism became more libertarian in basis
rather than conservative, but this is not, in fact, the case. In The Morals
of the Market, Jessica Whyte rightly argues that ‘Rather than an external
supplement, or a pragmatic partner, social conservatism, including expli-
cit appeals to family values, Christianity and ‘‘Western civilisation’’, was
foundational to the consolidation of organised neoliberalism in the mid
twentieth century’ (2019: 9), and that Hayek was central to this project.
In his inaugural address to the Mont Pèlerin Society, Hayek speaks of
‘moral aims’ and ‘moral fervour’ (1948: 109), and this concern with the
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question of morality became a theme of his later work, from his 1961
lecture on ‘The Moral Element in Free Enterprise’ (see 1967: 229–36)
through to Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973). The arguments of this
lecture are surprising: that if freedom is to ‘work well’ it ‘requires not
only moral standards but moral standards of a particular kind’, and, for
this reason, ‘we should do all in our power to spread the appropriate
moral convictions’ (1967: 230–1). Whyte explains that the importance of
morals, for Hayek, lies in their appeal to individual responsibility rather
than to government-led forms of ‘coercive enforcement’ (Whyte, 2019:
11). While it might seem such a position would be amenable to right-wing
libertarians, this is far from the case, as Murray Rothbard, in particular,
argued that Hayek was too conservative in his defence of tradition (2009:
67) and in believing that ‘reason and rationalism are synonymous with
government coercion . . . rather than realizing that reason is in fact the
very opposite of coercion’ (2009: 64). This, along with the continued role
Hayek gives to ‘noncoercive’ activities of the state, leads Rothbard to call
The Constitution of Liberty, in which Hayek actively sought to distance
himself from conservatism, an ‘evil’ and ‘dangerous’ book (2009: 61).
The purpose of this brief excursion into the history of neoliberalism
(which, clearly, is far from complete, and could, for example, be extended
into the 1980s and ’90 s to consider the infusion of neoliberal ideas and
principles into leftist thought, most notably in the form of Third Way
politics) is not to ascertain whether Hayek’s political commitments were
more libertarian or neoliberal in basis, but to show that neoliberalism has
never existed in a fixed relation to its political others but emerged in
tension to conservatism and libertarianism while, at times, sharing the
ground of both. This is important as it suggests that current conservative
and libertarian reactions against neoliberalism do not simply signal the
death of the latter, far from it, but rather the emergence of new, shifting
and hybrid political positions and interests on the political right. For this
reason, through the course of the current special issue, post-neoliberalism
is not used as a descriptor of a world beyond neoliberalism but rather as
a device for questioning the mutation of previous forms of liberalism and
neoliberalism and the challenges they pose in the present.
While the history of neoliberalism is not simply about Hayek, as
Foucault’s lectures have clearly shown, his triangulation of socialism,
conservatism and (neo-)liberalism continues to be useful as it can be
reconfigured to construct a different continuum of thought on the polit-
ical right: from libertarianism at one end to conservatism at the other,
with neoliberalism oscillating between the two. This understanding of
neoliberalism can be used to analyse different trajectories of neoliberal
reason, including those associated with the Chicago School. As Gane
shows in this special issue, Milton Friedman, for example, bridges both
conservatism and libertarianism in a different way as not only does he
prescribe a limited role for government but allocates a privileged position
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to the family, not the market, as the core institution of modern capitalist
society. As Melinda Cooper argues in Family Values (2017), Friedman
was strategic in taking such positions, for his defence of the family was
tied to an attack on state paternalism and a call instead for privatized
forms of welfare. This led to a coalition of interests between Friedman,
who spoke in favour of the family as an institution that could take on
many of the responsibilities of the welfare state, and more conservative
figures who believed in family values on more traditional grounds.
The ability of neoliberal thinkers to work with or at least alongside
their conservative and libertarian colleagues, often for particular political
purposes, explains, at least in part, both the continued success of the
neoliberal project and why neoliberalism has proved so difficult to
define. This is not to say, however, that there are no tensions between
these camps; quite the opposite, as the above example of Rothbard’s
hostility to Hayek’s work clearly shows. This special issue asks, then,
how the neoliberal project has continued to operate and even grow in
strength in spite of such tensions, and whether the uneasy alliances on the
political right between neoliberalism, conservatism and libertarianism
potentially provide as much of a threat to the stability of the neoliberal
project as any form of opposition from a leftist alternative. With these
questions in mind, a key concern of this issue is to consider the continued
operation and stability of neoliberalism in relation to a range of positions
and movements on the political right, including: paleoconservatism
(Cooper), neoreactionary politics (Smith and Burrows), ordonationalism
(Geva), libertarian paternalism (Gane), and new constitutionalism
(Slobodian).
In the opening paper of this issue, Melinda Cooper provides a geneal-
ogy of the Alt-right that traces its origins back to von Mises and then
forward through the work of his acolyte, Rothbard. Rothbard’s position
is more extreme than that of von Mises as it advocates what Cooper calls
the ‘total insurrection of the state’ and is based upon a ‘dichotomous
theory of power that saw the state as the instigator of all violence and the
market as a space of perfectly consensual exchange relations, where force
was only ever deployed legitimately, in defence of person and property’.
Rothbard’s economic method is nothing particularly new as it largely
followed von Mises in advancing a subjective theory of value based on
praxeology (for an overview see Rothbard, 1995), but his political pos-
ition is noteworthy as it sought to synthesize a libertarian and paleocon-
servative position. Cooper explains that paleoconservatism is important
because it is quite different to neoconservatism: it is not pro-New Deal or
born out of urban America. Instead, it stands for small government and
against internationalism, and is rooted in the history and politics of the
southern states of the US. Cooper argues that while this blend of liber-
tarianism and conservatism sat on the side-lines for many years, includ-
ing through the era of Reaganite conservatism, it can no longer be
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ignored, not least because of its influence on the Alt-right, which became
increasingly prominent through the Trump presidency.
Quinn Slobodian advances a comparable position to that of Cooper as
he argues that many of the fiercest criticisms of neoliberalism have come
not from the ‘grassroots social movements of the left’ but rather from
‘other movements on the political right’. Slodobian questions the
common assumption that there exists a ‘coherence of interests’ between
elites in the projects of free trade and globalization, and argues, instead,
that the New Constitutionalism of the 1990s onwards, which sought to
lock-in ‘private capital rights through multilateral legal entities insulated
from democracy’, did not benefit all elites in a similar way. Rather, there
were elites who lost through this process, most notably those involved in
heavy industries such as steel, which, while only a minor force in the US
economy, is ‘symbolically important to issues of deindustrialization,
unemployment, and masculinity’, especially in the Midwestern states
that were key to Trump’s election victory in 2016. Slobodian’s focus,
then, is on the disgruntled elites who sought a backlash to New
Constitutionalism not from below but from above, and whose interests
‘helped frame a critique of actually existing neoliberal globalism, which
Trump both adopted and acted on as part of his trade war’. In order to
understand this development, Slobodian argues, it is important that cri-
tiques of neoliberalism treat it not as ‘an overly coherent package’ but
pay close attention instead to the ‘power of particular sectors of capital in
bending legal structures to their benefit’. To do this, it is necessary for
analyses of neoliberalism to move beyond study of the financial sector to
look also at trade and manufacturing, which operate on different
grounds, not least because they require ‘more regularity and longer
time horizons’.
Dorit Geva addresses the refashioning of neoliberalism from the pol-
itical right in a different national context: Viktor Orbán’s reconfiguration
of state and government in Hungary. Geva argues that Orbán has estab-
lished a regime that moves beyond existing forms of neoliberalism as it
merges ‘authoritarianism, racist and patriarchal nationalism, clientelism,
and partial neoliberalization’. She argues that, in so doing, Orbán has
taken neoliberalism to its extreme as he has produced a new form of
Bonapartism for the neoliberal age, one ‘whose strategy for accumulation
of power is to take control of the state as primary arbiter over accumu-
lation of capital’. Geva calls this new type of political regime, which
operates through ‘brute racism, misogyny, and homophobia, along
with a take-over of universities, culture sectors, and the media’, a form
of ‘ordonationalism’. She argues that there are three main elements to
this new form of nationalism in Hungary: first, the re-composition of the
neoliberal state as ‘a selectively powerful and authoritarian’ institution;
second, the emptying of parliamentary democracy of any genuine con-
tent; and third, the dedication of state resources to enable ‘consumption
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as a source of social reproduction’. Geva argues, however, that the irony
of this new form of hyper-nationalist neoliberalism is that it has only
been possible because Orbán has made Hungary ‘the subservient partner
to several global powers’, in particular the EU, Russia, and China.
The above three papers, albeit implicitly, question the relation between
economic and political forms of sovereignty within different historical
and national configurations of neoliberalism. This question of sover-
eignty is the focus of William Davies’ article in this special issue, in
which he argues that since the global financial crisis of 2008 neoliberalism
can no longer be understood in terms of the economization or market-
ization of everything but, following key developments such as Brexit, by
the ejection of ‘economy’ from ‘political practice’. This ‘release’ of pol-
itics from economics in the post-crisis period, Davies argues, is defined by
resurgent forms of nationalism and protectionism that refocus attention
on territory and borders as the objects and limits of sovereign power.
Rather than seeing this as a break from neoliberalism, however, Davies
argues that this transition is ‘one that has occurred within the logic and
historical practices of neoliberalism’ and has therefore produced ‘popu-
list mutations of neoliberalism’ rather than a challenge to it. Davies
understands this development in terms of the ‘revenge of sovereignty’
upon forms of liberal governmentality – something that has worked by
rendering ‘the border (and threats to migrants) a crucial part of the
physics and metaphysics of the state’, and by striking ‘alliances and com-
binations with non-state centres of sovereign power’, in particular those
in the financial sector and platform capitalism.
Nicholas Gane addresses a different but related development in the
post-crisis period: the rise of behavioural or ‘nudge’ economics. Gane
argues that this type of economics flourished through this period because
at a time when financial markets entered a state of panic, figures such as
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler proposed that markets are populated
not by fully rational actors in the form of homo economicus but by human
beings prone to making mistakes. Because of this, they argue, raw liber-
tarianism is not the answer because individuals cannot be left to their
own devices as they cannot be relied upon to make life-choices from
which they will benefit. Instead, what is needed is a new form of soft
governance in the form of libertarian paternalism. Gane’s article ques-
tions the political values that underpin this form of governance and pays
particular attention to the gendered basis of this new type of authority,
the market-based norms that underpin libertarian paternalism, and its
empowerment of ‘experts’ and advisory teams to influence decision-
making both within and beyond the formal arena of party politics.
Gane’s view is that libertarian paternalism is not a post-neoliberal devel-
opment but rather a hybrid form of neoliberalism that departs, in
important respects, from Austrian, German and North American trajec-
tories of neoliberal reason while, at the same time, developing and
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extending these in new ways by addressing ‘internalities’ of consumer
behaviour that cannot be disciplined and corrected by raw market forces.
Smith and Burrows consider a more radical trajectory of right-wing
libertarianism through the post-crisis period in the USA: the Alt-right.
They do so by focusing on the influence of four key figures – Nick Land,
Curtis Yarvin, Peter Thiel, and Patri Friedman – who are united not by a
neoliberal imperative to marketize the state but rather by a drive to exit
from all forms of state intervention and control. Smith and Burrows pay
close attention to the right accelerationism of neoreactionary thought
(NRx) which, inspired by Nick Land’s vision of Dark Enlightenment,
advances a stark alternative to state-centred forms of neoliberalism: to
retire all government employees and run society as a business. This pro-
posal, which calls for democratic institutions to be replaced by rule by a
CEO or monarch, is articulated most forcefully by Curtis Yarvin, who
views Prussian cameralism, in which a state is a business that owns a
country, as the most viable model for a future politics. Yarvin’s contri-
bution to this project is Urbit: a digital platform based on a centreless
network of networks that seeks to ‘‘‘redecentralize’’ the web for the 21st
century’. Technologies such as Urbit, Smith and Burrows argue, lead us
towards a post-neoliberal world, one based on decentralized platforms
and ‘patchwork’ forms of sovereignty and governance rather than any
commitment to democracy, which is described by Land not just as
‘doomed’ but ‘doom itself’.
Alan Finlayson addresses a different aspect of what might be called the
Dark Enlightenment: the rise of ‘ideological entrepreneurs’ opposed to
progressivism and social reform. Finlayson argues that these entrepre-
neurs have been empowered by new forms of digital communication, and
that while contradictory and conflicting positions have emerged across
the Alt-right (from conservatism through to ethnonationalism and liber-
tarianism), these are united in opposition to liberal ideas of the state. In
particular, what unifies the Alt-right is a belief in the value of inequality.
Finlayson explains: ‘inequality is a core concept, understood as a natural
phenomenon, scientifically verified and the necessary basis of civil order,
essential to the maintenance of individual freedom, economic stability
and cultural coherence’. Such views are consistent with those of Hayek,
who was openly critical of the attempts by welfarist states to equalize
natural differences between individuals, but Finalyson observes that con-
temporary forms of right-wing populism go further than this as they
advance ‘a broad-based challenge to the technocratic politics of third-
way neoliberalism and globalization’ and share a common enemy: ‘the
establishment’, ‘the swamp’, ‘the blob’, ‘the cathedral’. Finlayson argues,
however, that while such reactionary politics might be seen as opposing
neoliberalism, they cannot simply be termed ‘post-neoliberal’ as, among
other things, they demand ‘yet greater marketization of ideas and ideol-
ogies, culture and consciousness’.
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The Crisis of 2020
The right-wing intellectual and political forces, which several of the col-
lected papers explore, attained public visibility over the years of the
Trump presidency, culminating in the astonishing storming of the
Capitol Building on 6 January 2021. Trump’s core support had been
dressed up in various ways over the previous five years – as ‘populist’,
‘nativist’, ‘left behind’. But we should not duck the fact that it was
also driven by white nationalist and neo-fascist impulses and ideas.
A post-neoliberalism driven by appeals to ‘nation’, and attacks on the
governmental liberal state, may derive from a range of libertarian and
conservative traditions, but it also offers dangerous space for the Far
Right. That these forces suffered electoral defeat in the United States,
at least, was heavily thanks to another challenge to neoliberalism alto-
gether, emanating from the non-human world.
Neoliberalism’s ‘death’ has been prematurely announced on multiple
occasions, most widely in response to the global financial crisis of 2008
and then in response to the electoral upheavals that shook Britain and
the United States in 2016. The appearance of COVID-19 at the end of
2019, which had been declared a pandemic by the following spring,
provoked a fresh round of arguments regarding its implications for neo-
liberalism (e.g. Saad-Filho, 2020). Many analyses focused on how the
virus had exposed the limits of the neoliberal state (e.g. Jones and
Hameiri, 2021). And yet, perhaps mindful of how previous obituaries
have been overturned by events, few have been willing to declare the
end of neoliberalism on this occasion. Long-standing authorities on
the topic predicted that neoliberal forces would exploit the chaos of
the pandemic as they had done in previous emergencies, and emerge
even stronger as a result (Mirowski, 2020; Klein, 2020). The renewed
reliance of many governments on exceptional monetary policies, of the
sort deployed in the aftermath of 2008, indicated that policy-makers
(especially those in central banks) were drawing on their experiences
over the global financial crisis (Tooze, 2020), potentially translating
into a further bail-out for asset-holders and corporations (Brenner,
2020). In any case, the events of 2020 were not triggered directly by
failures of the price system, in the way that those of 2008 had been.
To take the UK, for example, its experience of the pandemic exhibited
many of the hallmarks of neoliberal government of recent decades,
together with the dire social consequences of neoliberal reforms to the
welfare state and health service. As the British government entered emer-
gency response mode, the public was shocked to discover how profitable
the provision of public goods and services had become for well-
positioned firms and consultants, able to hoover up contracts at short
notice. The steady ‘hollowing out’ of the state, and the replacement of
public administrators by private contractors, is a central feature of
Davies and Gane 15
British neoliberalism that has been studied extensively since the 1990s but
came dramatically to the fore during 2020 (Rhodes, 1996; Bowman et al,
2015; Christophers, 2020). The health crisis was a huge opportunity for
firms such as Serco and Palantir, who offered to deliver central state
functions of security and surveillance, and who are likely to expand
their reach into the public sector (and its data) as a result. Meanwhile,
analyses of Britain’s high mortality rate emphasized the impact of
inequality and cuts to social spending, especially those that began in
2010, which had been influencing mortality rates and life expectancy
well before the arrival of COVID-19 (Marmot et al., 2020).
On the other hand, even seasoned watchers of neoliberal crises may
have been taken aback by certain macroeconomic aspects of the policy
response, which flew in the face of orthodoxies of the previous 40 years.
The dramatic rise of government borrowing, which covered the cost of
pandemic responses and unprecedented falls in GDP, had no effect on
the cost of borrowing (real interest on government debt remained close to
zero over 2020–21), overturning the justification for austerity measures in
Britain and the Eurozone. Equally extraordinary was the fact that, in the
context of the UK, the vast majority of the debt was being bought by the
Bank of England, raising suspicions (denied by the Bank) that Britain
was now engaged in an experiment in ‘monetary financing’ of the state.
In the United States, Jerome Powell, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, announced in summer 2020 that the Fed would be prepared
to accept higher inflation in the medium-term, in order to get the econ-
omy growing again, an explicit contradiction of the monetarist and
‘supply-side’ orthodoxy at the heart of Reaganism and Thatcherism.
The appointment of Lina Khan, a well-known critic of ‘Big Tech’, as
Chair of the Federal Trade Commission in June 2021 represented the
most significant departure from the Chicago School paradigm of anti-
trust since it became embedded in the US in the 1970s. Janet Yellen, the
US Treasury Secretary, spoke of the need for a minimum global corpor-
ation tax to prevent a competitive ‘race for the bottom’ on taxation.
Meanwhile, the size of the Biden administration’s fiscal stimulus – $1.9
trillion – was sufficiently large to suggest a significant political realign-
ment to the left, and led to warnings of inflation from mainstream neo-
liberal voices such as Larry Summers and The Economist. At least in the
use of macroeconomic policy levers, the pandemic led to a more dramatic
overturning of neoliberal orthodoxies than any other financial or polit-
ical crises of the previous two decades, and which has already left a
residue in the rationale of ‘Bidenomics’, suggesting that this crisis may
be understood as ‘1979 in reverse’ (Durand, 2021). These are signs that
perhaps there is finally a type of Kuhnian shift in the ‘policy paradigm’ of
neoliberalism. The fiscal opportunities provided by ultra-low borrowing
costs, that had been highlighted by many critics of neoliberalism (e.g.
Lonergan and Blyth, 2020), have finally been seized by default.
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The precedent of the global financial crisis would suggest that, once
this period of emergency has passed, then a more familiar, routinized
form of neoliberal government will be re-established, albeit with even
greater public debts than were accrued in 2008–9. There are, however,
a number of critical areas where the events of 2020–21 will alter the
conditions of political and economic activity, in ways that may well syn-
thesize something entirely new and no longer recognizable as ‘neoliberal’.
At the same time, this would likely lead to a renewal of liberal and
libertarian critiques of the status quo, of a sort that have already
gained some momentum in the context of lock-downs and behavioural
surveillance. The coming years will cast a fresh light on prospects for
‘post-neoliberalism’, and potentially heighten the influence of some of the
counter-movements and rival political projects explored in this issue.
The first trend that looks likely to endure, as a set of ‘problems’ if not
necessarily as political strategy, is the renewed ascendency of key instru-
ments of statistical governmentality, of the sort explored by Foucault in
Security, Territory, Population. The central problem of the pandemic,
which will not suddenly disappear (not least due to long-term risk man-
agement of possible future pandemics), concerns the object that Foucault
views as emerging over the 18th century, thanks to the development of
statistics and demographic expertise: population (Foucault, 2007: 71).
COVID-19 has thrust new emphasis upon biopolitical techniques for
the modelling and influencing of behaviour, with an emphasis on the
immanent ‘laws’ of population, epidemiology especially. Getting individ-
uals to conform to rapidly established norms so as to limit transmission
rates, with a view to preventing health systems from being ‘over-
whelmed’, is a consummate example of liberal governmentality.
This has further elevated the status of behavioural psychologists and
‘nudge’ techniques in larger networks of governmentality, both in and
beyond the state. Gane’s contribution to this issue details the ambiguous
status of such techniques in the longer history of liberalism and neo-
liberalism, which he sees as geared towards the construction of individ-
uals corrected for rather than by the market. The core idea of the nudge
agenda is ‘libertarian paternalism’, which stands for soft behavioural
interventions rather than hard state authority wherever possible. The
importance of this new form of libertarianism became clear in the early
stages of the COVID crisis as the British government briefly hoped that it
could avoid a lock-down in the Spring of 2020, purely by relying on
behavioural expertise to govern individual choices (Calvert and
Arbuthnott, 2021).
If, as Davies explores in his contribution to this issue, neoliberalism
has pursued a slow dismantling of the collectivist edifices of liberal gov-
ernment (most significantly, a welfare state organized around a principle
of social insurance), the pandemic has occasioned a renewed requirement
for governmental instruments that can act upon ‘society’ according to
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statistical logics of risk and normality. The prominence of statistical
charts and models in the public life of liberal democracies over 2020–
21 was evidence of a renewed dependence of the state upon forms of
centralized quantitative expertise and demographic rationality, of the
sort that neoliberal intellectuals had always feared and believed would
lead to the destruction of liberty (Slobodian, 2018; Whyte, 2019).
Whether COVID-19 leads to a political reappraisal of the 20th-century
welfare state (a revival of pre-neoliberalism) remains to be seen, but in a
strictly technical sense, the government of sickness, the labour market,
housing and the family has become a political objective all over again, in
ways that cannot be left to emergent forces of competition and enter-
prise. Forms of local solidarity, collective responsibility and collective
risk reappeared over the course of the pandemic and may not be easily
forgotten. Another lesson of the global financial crisis is that, while emer-
gency policy responses do not themselves endure, the shared memory of
them does, which can have unpredictable political consequences several
years later.
A second consequence of the pandemic, which will shape how and
whether neoliberalism endures, is the rapid reassertion of national bor-
ders as instruments of national health security and surveillance. Infection
rates during the first wave of COVID-19 corresponded closely to the
amount of international air travel in and out of a country and a city
(Pana et al., 2021). Nations such as New Zealand were widely praised for
closing their borders very early in the pandemic. New infrastructures of
border security and control have been hastily assembled, such as the use
of hotels as quarantining facilities and mobile tracking devices of new
arrivals. A crucial condition of globalization, namely international jet
travel, has become a new source of risk to be restricted and governed
in new ways, generating new inequalities in mobility and exacerbating
existing ones. The renewed reliance on national infrastructures of gov-
ernmentality – health services, vaccination programs, surveillance sys-
tems, demographic statistics – has turned the global into a space of
incalculable uncertainty and threats.
To be sure, this does not necessarily upset the direction of the neo-
liberalism of the previous decade. While liberating and ‘encasing’ the
economic space of the ‘global’ may have been a long-standing ambition
of neoliberals (Slobodian, 2018), numerous scholars have pointed to the
rising nationalism, ethnocentricity and authoritarianism of neoliberal-
ism in the wake of the global financial crisis (Callison and Manfredi,
2019). The early neoliberals were themselves somewhat divided over
whether people should be granted freedoms to move internationally,
or whether such liberty should be reserved for goods and capital, and
were generally concerned to defend the ethnic and cultural distinction
of ‘the West’ vis-à-vis trading partners in Asia or the Global South
(Slobodian, 2018).
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The contributions of Cooper, Slobodian and Geva each casts some
light on the resurfacing of national and ethnic hierarchy, in response to
the perceived cultural relativism, globalism and elitism of existing centres
of technocratic power. Whether in the case of Orbán’s Hungary (Geva),
Trump’s America (Slobodian) or the paleo-conservatism of Rothbard
(Cooper), we can witness overlapping critiques of cosmopolitanism and
international finance. These critiques are made in the name of purport-
edly more ‘natural’ or traditional economic units, namely those of family,
territory, property and nation. Markets play an important role in this
imaginary, but only to the extent that they conserve hierarchies and
national identities, and not where they blur the boundaries of family,
race and nation. A striking feature of these three papers is that, in each
case, there is a rejection of the relativist, Hayekian faith in unplanned,
competitive forces, and instead a commitment to protecting and nurtur-
ing the ‘right’ producers, lifestyles and demographics. The state is repur-
posed from a neoliberal one, which sets the ‘rules of the game’ but takes
no interest in the outcome, to one that acts with explicit cultural, ethnic
and economic biases. In that sense, the exit from neoliberalism is
authentic.
On some level, the pandemic will serve to advance these agendas, at
least by accelerating the tendency towards the repatriation of many
supply chains and the much stricter regulation of migration. Yet the
rhetoric, justifications and technologies of national bordering are likely
to change significantly as a result of the pandemic. Already, the securing
of Europe’s Mediterranean border has become defended according to a
new logic of upholding the ‘safety’ of both migrants and host populations
(Tazzioli and Stierl, 2021). The permeability of borders is becoming
increasingly dictated by biopolitical calculations, overseen by a familiar
litany of public-private partnerships, which draws consultants, outsour-
cing contractors and data analysts into the government of human mobil-
ity (Amoore, 2013). Warnings against ‘vaccine nationalism’ have, as yet,
not been well-heeded, while emergent varieties of health nationalism, as
have already been mobilized by some populist movements (see Fitzgerald
et al., 2020), mesh with sovereign programs for the strengthening of
borders more generally. As Foucault warned in Society Must Be
Defended, a scientific nationalism – which is also a scientific racism –
focuses the biopolitical force of the nation-state upon purification, seek-
ing to safeguard health and vitality for some by denying it to others
(Foucault, 2004).
Finally, the pandemic has brought the changing nature of public-pri-
vate services and governance more clearly into view, but now with
another corporate entity in play, namely platforms. Many analyses of
neoliberal reforms of the late 20th century focused on the blurring
of state and business, as manifest in ‘new public management’, discourses
of ‘national competitiveness’, the rise of outsourcing industries, plus a
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generalized ethic of enterprise that was pushed into all corners of social
and political life. These are features of the ‘roll-out’ phase of neoliberal
reform, in contrast to the ‘roll-back’ phase that took aim at organized
labour and the welfare state (Peck and Tickell, 2002). The pandemic has
undoubtedly clarified the sustained dominance and consequences of this
longstanding reliance on market mechanisms for the provision of public
goods. But even more so, it has demonstrated the infrastructural and
unavoidable power of privately-owned digital platforms as conditions
of social and economic life.
Critical scholarly analysis of platforms has grown rapidly, since the
consolidation of the ‘big five’ (Amazon, Facebook, Alphabet, Apple,
Microsoft) around the time of the financial crisis (Gillespie, 2010;
Srnicek, 2016; Dijck et al., 2018). The exceptional dominance of plat-
forms is itself partly a side-effect of neoliberal reforms, in particular the
success of the Chicago School critique of anti-trust that took hold in the
courts and regulatory agencies in the US from the 1970s onwards, which
made them more sympathetic to monopoly (Davies, 2010; Rahman and
Thelen, 2019; Christophers, 2020). As ‘multi-sided markets’, and as pur-
veyors of social connectivity, platforms have innate tendencies towards
monopoly, which is tolerated to the extent that they exploit legal and
normative grey areas, while allowing consumers to act as their public
advocates (Langley and Leyshon, 2016; Culpepper and Thelen, 2020).
Platforms are both ubiquitous and impossible to pin down in legal and
regulatory terms, extracting data and rents from their pivotal position in
social life, which they were never formally granted. These businesses have
arguably exploited the emergency of the pandemic more than any other
type of business, whether in relation to home-working, home-schooling,
the gig economy, or retail.
No account of the pandemic can possibly exclude the role performed
by platforms in sustaining (while also reconfiguring) social and economic
life over the course of lockdowns and home confinements. The ‘big tech’
platforms are owned and governed as corporations, and yet they have
achieved a status as social infrastructure that goes well beyond the typical
providers of a commercial service (Plantin et al., 2018). Conceived as a
vast in vivo experiment, the pandemic has shown the extent to which
work, retail, education and sociality can now survive the demise of high-
streets, workplaces, schools, campuses and hospitality spaces, all thanks
to platforms. This ‘discovery’ will not be forgotten easily, and – should it
be seized as the basis for radical reforms over the coming years – it will
cast fresh emphasis on the politics of the family, home and household, as
the holding environment which shapes careers, learning, health and
security.
According to Mirowski, it is a tenet of neoliberalism that ‘corpor-
ations can do no wrong, or at least they are not to be blamed if they
do’ (Mirowski, 2009: 438). American neoliberals abandoned their
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normative critique of monopoly from the 1950s onwards, and the US
pressured European regulators to follow suit from the 1990s onwards.
And yet, if a new form of capitalism is emerging, built around monop-
olistic surveillance infrastructures, and with that business model coincid-
ing with (and in many instances partnering with) renewed state ambitions
for the surveillance, tracking, influencing and statistical modelling of
populations, this raises questions as to the fates of liberal and libertarian
wings of neoliberalism. What becomes of the heroic vision of the entre-
preneurial, self-authored individual under these conditions? One answer
may lurk in the contribution of Smith and Burrows, whose paper uses the
example of Urbit, a libertarian computing project that seeks to ‘redecen-
tralize’ control over data. The ideology fuelling such innovations is one
that seeks to reclaim individual sovereignty from both nation-states and
corporations, in favour of a radical autonomy, beyond the reaches of any
centralized governance.
The paranoid perception that a single ‘progressive’ class of elites and
technocrats now runs the world, whether via states, corporations, media
conglomerates or multilateral regulators, is common to many strands of
libertarian critiques of contemporary neoliberalism. This is a major
strand of Finlayson’s contribution to this issue, which examines how vari-
ous online reactionary communities have organized and self-identified
against the so-called ‘new class’ of liberal elites. This class is perceived
to have attained a kind of political monopoly over political and cultural
institutions, which it exploits to impose its unnatural, culturally relativist
and ‘Marxist’ ideology upon people, removing their freedom of speech
and disrupting ‘natural’ gender identities. The goal of the online groups
that mobilize against this class is to disrupt that monopoly, in a heroic
moment of Schumpeterian creative destruction, of the sort that Trump
represented to many of his fans.
The more outlandish, sovereigntist movements (as explored by Smith
and Burrows) dream of founding whole new societies beyond the reaches
of states and corporations, and not just of disrupting the current ones.
No doubt the pandemic, and the escalation of rules and surveillance that
it has occasioned, will generate a host of new utopian visions of autono-
mous individuality, beyond the reaches of the corporate platform or
biosecurity state. But more visibly, and in the near term, the movements
that react against the governmentality of COVID-19 are closer to those
explored by Finlayson, characterized by a generalized suspicion towards
politicians, experts, the media, ‘big pharma’ and ‘big tech’. In an intri-
guing study of organized COVID scepticism in Germany, Callison and
Slobodian (2021) pick out some of its salient features. Many activists are
self-employed, politically unaligned and fearful of the perceived alliances
between states, big business and the media, who they believe are lying to
them. In that particular German context, many of the emerging ideo-
logues of such movements hark back to Kant and the Enlightenment,
Davies and Gane 21
believing that COVID has unleashed an assault on individual freedom of
speech, thought and behaviour. There is, as Callison and Slobodian point
out, a certain discomfort in the positioning of such movements, given
that they depend heavily on internet platforms for their coordination and
very existence. This is, ironically, a revolt of the petite bourgeoisie, whose
conditions of possibility lie in Silicon Valley’s vast capitalization of data.
COVID has undoubtedly unleashed some of the ‘same old’ neoliberal
responses, including the kinds of ‘shock doctrine’ responses foreseen by
Klein. Many recognized the pandemic as an opportunity or an ‘opening’
through which commercial services could be pushed further into the
delivery of public services and other basic social requirements.
Ideologically, however, in an era of tightening national borders, escalat-
ing surveillance of biosecurity threats, and massive fiscal expansion, it is
hard to classify the present political conjuncture as ‘neoliberal’. The
question, then, is where liberal, conservative or libertarian resistance to
such political regimes will take root most strongly. Appeals to nation, to
individual sovereignty, to democratic sovereignty, to racial and cultural
hierarchy are all being made, as the papers in this issue explore in dif-
ferent ways.
Conclusion
By most definitions, ‘neoliberalism’ implies the use of state powers to
expand and enforce market mechanisms and competition in society. In
this introduction, and in the articles that follow, we can witness some
manifest departures from and mutations (Callison and Manfredi, 2019)
of this project. The victory of neoliberal ideas and reforms from the
1970s onwards has led to scenarios in which the defence of the market
is in the hands of large technocratic agencies and multilateral institutions,
including central banks (Gane, 2015) and trade organizations
(Slobodian, 2018) that, while positioning themselves as outside the
formal arena of party politics, in fact continue politics by other means.
Many of the rightwing critiques explored in this special issue target such
institutions, on the basis that they are elitist, ‘progressive’, ‘globalist’ and
implicitly disloyal to the more primary units of nation and family.
Alongside such conservative positions, libertarian critics (writing on web-
sites such as Zerohedge), particularly in the US, have argued that gov-
ernment interventions to stabilize and boost financial markets have
distorted natural mechanisms of competition, and with this the workings
of the price system.
This said, however, it is not clear whether neoliberal states or their
libertarian critics remain committed to the defence of competitive,
unplanned forces at all costs. Post-2008, libertarian critiques of (actually
existing) neoliberalism have come to focus more on the sovereignty of
property rights and the property-holder than on seeking to defend spaces
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of competition or exchange. And some prominent figures on the liber-
tarian right, in particular Peter Thiel (see the article by Smith and
Burrows), rather than seek to restore the natural equilibrium of the
free market no longer see competition to be a natural force for the
good of all but something believed in by ‘losers’ (Thiel, 2014). The
task, for Thiel, is now to ‘capture and create last value’ by building
monopolies. As Will Davies (2014) observes, this signals a shift from a
neoliberal order defined by a commitment to competition and govern-
mental enforcement of rules of the game to a different type of order in
which winning at all costs becomes the primary objective (for further
elaboration of this point see Gane, 2020). In such a world the values
of democracy, equality and tolerance have been placed under renewed
attack by new forms of authoritarian governance (as Geva documents in
Hungary) and the play of big corporate powers. Even Hayek’s belief in
the rule of law, which was so central to key books such as The
Constitution of Liberty, is now rejected by those on the political right
who seek exit from the regulatory powers of state and government,
although it is worth noting that, for libertarian critics such as
Rothbard (2009: 61–7), the rule of law was already part of the problem.
Through the course of the current COVID crisis, the stability of the
neoliberal order, and with this the legal ‘encasement’ of the global market
(Slobodian, 2018), looks increasingly uncertain. Regulatory and monet-
ary institutions, which in the neoliberal heyday of the 1990s were proudly
agnostic regarding who should ‘win’ from the ‘global race’, have been
gradually repurposed (or bypassed) over recent years to tackle crises of
economic stagnation, social cohesion, COVID-19 and climate change.
The difficulty is that these same institutions remain undemocratic by
design, which adds fuel to the fire of those ‘populist’, anti-expert and
anti-governmental movements which suspect all power as being a form of
conspiracy. To those on the nationalist or libertarian right, this merely
confirms their suspicions about the political takeover that has been
waged by technocrats, ‘globalists’ and elites since the 1980s.
This special issue, then, is concerned not with a sudden disappearance
of neoliberal policy elites, instruments and institutions, but a popular and
intellectual discrediting of them combined with belated attempts to
repurpose them towards ends beyond the market. The isolation of eco-
nomic policy-making from democracy (in areas such as monetary policy
and antitrust) was a clear aim of neoliberal intellectuals and policy refor-
mers. In the decade following the financial crisis, that same isolation
became the basis of the legitimacy crisis that was exploited by anti-
establishment parties across the liberal capitalist world (Hopkin, 2020).
The question now is whether technocracies will be able to alleviate inter-
locking social, ecological and health crises in time, and be recognized for
doing so.
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